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TARGET BOARDS AND THE 
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE US 
 
Vivek Tata* 
 
This article uses SEC filings, public reports, cases, and press 
reports to examine how companies involved in transactions 
for control approach review by the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Due  to the case-
by-case nature of CFIUS review and the evolving and 
politicized nature of the review process, it can be difficult to 
assess how to approach interactions with CFIUS. In addition 
to examining how companies allocate risks related to CFIUS 
review, this article attempts to provide a short primer on how 
target boards might assess and analyze the CFIUS process. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During a four-week period in early 2016, action by the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
 or 
rejection of three cross-border deal proposals. All three 
involved investments from Chinese companies into the 
United States. In the first situation, CFIUS blocked an 
investment in Philips Lumileds, a U.S. subsidiary of Philips.1 
In the second case, out of fear of CFIUS action, U.S.-based 
proposal and accepted a lower bid from an American 
company.2 In the third instance, a Chinese firm 
 
* J.D. 2016, Stanford Law School 
1 Toby Sterling, U.S. Blocks Philips' $3.3 Billion Sale of 
Lumileds to Asian Buyers, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2016, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philips-lumileds-sale- 
idUSKCN0V02D4. 
2 See Press Release, Fairchild Semiconductor, Fairchild 
Board of Directors Determines the Acquisition Proposal from China 
Resources and Hua Capital is Not a Superior Proposal, (Feb. 
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terminated its investment plan in a U.S. company after CFIUS 
began an investigation.3 These cases are but a snapshot of the 
-border mergers and 
acquisitions. 
This article considers the impact of CFIUS review from 
the perspective of a U.S. corporate board involved in a 
transaction for control.4 This article begins with a brief 
introduction into CFIUS, including its mechanisms for 
control and brief history. Next, the article addresses CFIUS 
concerns during the offer stage  how a target board should 
approach a hostile offer from a foreign acquirer or how a 
board might prepare itself for a friendly deal. Third, it looks 
at key deal terms, such as the price and deal protection 
measures a board should take to protect shareholders from the 
costs of a blocked deal. As might be expected from a 
committee focused on national security, CFIUS provides 
relatively little in the way of public disclosure. This article 
 
16, 2016), https://www.fairchildsemi.com/about/press- 
releases/Press-Release.html?id=20160216-fairchild-board-of- 
directors; Keith Bradsher & Paul Mozur, Political Backlash Grows 
in Washington to Chinese Takeovers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/18/business/dealbook/china- 
fairchild-semiconductor-bid-rejected.html. 
3 Arash Massoudi & James Fontanella-Khan, Tsinghua 
kills $3.8bn investment plan in Western Digital, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Feb. 23, 2016). Tsinghua sought an approximately 15% stake in 
Western Digital and requested a board seat. Id. 
4 The threshold at which a transaction may result in 
example, while shareholdings below 50% are not generally 
considered controlling, a plaintiff can demonstrate actual control 
through domination of corporate conduct by a minority shareholder. 
See 
1994) (holding a 43.3% minority shareholder to have had control over 
business decisions). CFIUS, of course, is not bound by state 
corporation law definitions of control and may look beyond these 
shareholding thresholds. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.301(a) (2016) 
(delineating which transactions are covered transactions). CFIUS 
de
thresholds still trigger review. 
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relies on SEC filings, corporate releases, cases, and press 
reports to understand how boards have addressed CFIUS- 
related challenges. 
 
 
II. THE COMMITTEE S EVOLVING ROLE 
CFIUS is a U.S.-based, interagency committee 
comprised of key executive branch officials.5 A transaction is 
6 Notification is 
voluntarily, but if parties fail to notify the Committee, it may 
still take action, even after a deal is closed.7 In general, CFIUS 
raises three concerns for parties to a potentially covered 
transaction. First, the review process takes a good deal of 
time, which can delay an agreement: thirty days for the initial 
review and forty-five days for the investigation, should one 
be necessary.8 Regarding lengthy investigations, it is likely a 
covered transaction will be investigated   during the six-year 
period from 2009 to 2014, CFIUS reported it conducted 
investigations in nearly 40% of cases.9 Second, the 
Committee may indicate that certain mitigation measures are 
necessary. 10 The Committee may also recommend that an 
approved deal be unwound due to failures to comply with 
mitigation requirements.11 Third, the Committee can 
recommend that the President block or 
 
 
5 SEE JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, 
THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN  THE  UNITED 
 STATES (CFIUS) 1 7 (2016), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf. 
6 31 C.F.R § 800.301(a). 
7 31 C.F.R § 800.401(a), (b) (2016). 
8 31 C.F.R. § 800.501 506 (2016). For example, in the 
2015. China's Anbang Insurance Gets U.S. Go-ahead for 
$1.95 bln Waldorf Astoria Buy, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2015, 8:48 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/anbang-waldorf- 
idUSB9N0TO01420150202. 
9 JACKSON, supra note 5, at 25. 
10 31 C.F.R. § 800.501 506. 
11 E.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 6. 
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suspend a transaction.12 While it is extraordinarily rare for the 
President to block a deal, the threat of such sanction forces 
CFIUS may recommend divestiture, even post- closing.13 
A history of CFIUS is beyond the scope of this article; 
however, it is worth noting CFIUS has often been a lightning 
rod for those concerned about the influence or threat posed by 
particular foreign countries. The first major expansion of 
-Florio provision, was 
a reaction to concerns over Japanese takeovers of U.S. 
firms.14 In 2007, concerns about Middle Eastern investors led 
to the Foreign Investment and Security Act, which expanded 
and homeland security concerns.15 
Over the past decade, observers conclude CFIUS has 
begun to focus more on Chinese investments. 16 One 
innocuous explanation is China is also the largest source of 
 
12 31 C.F.R. § 800.506(b). 
13 E.g., MEREDITH M. BROWN, RALPH C. FERRARA & PAUL 
S. BIRD, TAKEOVERS: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS SUPPLEMENT 1 16 (2010) (describing the Polaris 
Financial divestiture of IdenTrust and the Ralls case). 
14 One deal of note involved a potential sale of Fairchild 
Semiconductor to Fujitsu, which fell through in the face of political 
opposition. JACKSON, supra note 5, at 3 4. See also Margaret L. 
Merrill, Overcoming CFIUS Jitters: A Practical Guide for 
Understanding the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 19 (2011). As described in the 
introduction, Fairchild recently rejected an offer partially out of 
concerns over CFIUS approval  perhaps due to experiencing deja 
vu. 
15 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110 49, § 4, 121 Stat. 246, 253 54 (2007). 
16  See Shawn Donnan, US Reviews of Investments Made by 
China Increase, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6ef4ffdc-d75b-11e5-969e- 
9d801cf5e15b.html#axzz45OCDI376;     see    also    Minxin    Pei, 
Washington Is Giving the Cold Shoulder to Chinese Investment, 
FORTUNE (Feb. 23, 2016, 10:43 AM), 
http://fortune.com/2016/02/23/chinese-company-acquisitions-us- 
companies/. 
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covered transactions, comprising nearly 20% of the total 
covered transactions over the three-year period from 2012 
through 2014. 17 However, members of Congress have raised 
explicit concerns about Chinese investment, including 
recommending publicly that CFIUS review specific deals.18 
Coupled with its record of investigation into Chinese 
acquisitions, it is reasonable to conclude CFIUS is 
particularly concerned about Chinese investment. It has 
Astoria 19 
company.20 
The Committee will consider a range of threats in its 
review. 21 Of particular importance is the relationship 
between the target business and the acquiring country; for 
example, it is hard to imagine a U.K. acquirer facing the same 
in-depth investigation and public opposition as the Chinese 
firm Shuanghui International when it acquired Smithfield 
Foods.22 Critics of the deal specifically focused 
 
17 JACKSON, supra note 5, at 19. 
18 See Rebecca Spalding, Affymetrix Bid's China Ties Spark 
National Security Talk, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2016, 6:57 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-21/affymetrix- 
bid-s-china-ties-must-be-examined-congresswoman-says; see also 
David Mclaughlin, Chinese Bid for Chicago Exchange Draws 
Congressional Concern, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2016, 12:34 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-17/chinese-bid- 
for-chicago-exchange-draws-congressional-concern. 
19 China's Anbang Insurance Gets U.S. Go-ahead for $1.95 
bln Waldorf Astoria Buy, supra note 8. 
20 SuccessFactors, Inc., Tender Offer Statement Amend. 7 
(Schedule TO/A) (Dec. 16, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1402305/000119312512 
019895/d268167dsctota.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
21 See  generally  THEODORE  H. MORAN, THREE THREATS: 
AN  ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK FOR THE CFIUS PROCESS (2009) 
(categorizing CFIUS threats into three groups: The first threat is the 
foreign acquisition of key resources, such that the U.S. might become 
reliant on a foreign power for essential goods or services. The second 
threat involves the potential for transfer of technology or expertise to 
a foreign power.  The third threat involves the risk of espionage or 
infiltration through acquisition of key assets.). 
22 See Michael J. de la  Merced, U.S. Security Panel Clears 
a Chinese Takeover of Smithfield Foods, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013, 
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on concerns about Chinese food safety practices,23 which 
might not have been relevant for an acquirer based in another 
country. 
 
 
III. CFIUS CONSIDERATIONS IN THE OFFER 
STAGE 
When a U.S. board receives an offer from a foreign 
acquirer, it should include CFIUS considerations in planning 
its response. Whether or not the offer is solicited by the target, 
the uncertainties created by the CFIUS process create both 
opportunities and problems for target boards of directors. 
 
 
A. HOSTILE OFFERS 
For boards facing a hostile offer, the prospect of CFIUS 
1990, nearly half of the transactions CFIUS investigated were 
24 Although this percentage 
has dropped to approximately 20% over the past six years,25 
it is still quite high. A target board could, therefore, argue that 
such transactions do not warrant 
 
 
6:25 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/national- 
security-panel-approves-smithfield-sale-to-chinese-company/. 
23 Press Release, Debbie Stabenow, Bipartisan Group of 
Senators Urge Appropriate Oversight of Proposed Smithfield 
Purchase   (June  20,  2013), 
http://www.stabenow.senate.gov/news/bipartisan-group-of- 
senators-urge-appropriate-oversight-of-proposed-smithfield- 
purchase (last visited Oct. 28, 2016); Letter from Senators Max 
Baucus and Orrin Hatch, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Fin., to the Hon. 
Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Rep., and the Hon. Jacob Lew, U.S. 
Sec. of the  Treasury (June 21, 2013), 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062113%20Smithfi 
eld%20Letter.pdf. 
24 JACKSON, supra note 5, at 9. 
25  Id. at 6.  Note the percentage of withdrawn notices per   year 
fluctuates significantly  in 2012, it was close to 44%, but in 2014, 
it was only 18%. 
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serious consideration without a prohibitive premium and 
onerous deal protection measures. 
In the antitrust context, it is well established that an 
informed board can decline an offer that is higher in nominal 
terms but that creates real regulatory risk.26 Given these cases, 
it seems likely that a board which informs itself about the 
risks involved with CFIUS review  mandatory divestitures, 
delays, or even a blocked deal  would be protected by the 
business judgment rule.27 Indeed, this is what Fairchild 
Semiconductor recently concluded when it found a nominally 
higher offer from a Chinese consortium did not constitute a 
American company.28 The board did not change its 
-or- high-water 
-  deal.29 
Courts are also likely to draw a parallel with antitrust 
 
mitigation measures in evaluating an offer.  In In 
 
26 See 
CIV.A. 6623- VCN, 2013 WL 396202 at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013) 
(informed and legitimate concerns about antitrust risk are sufficient 
to presum -faith business judgment); In re Cogent, 
regulatory approvals relating to antitrust considerations presents a 
 In 
re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781 n.6 
considering any legitimate threat that the antitrust laws posed to   the 
consummation of any West Point  
27 The business judgment rule is the presumption that  
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action 
t Disney 
Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) 
(citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
28 Fairchild Semiconductor  Recommendation 
Statement (Schedule 14D-9A) (Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1036960/000119312516 
463934/d22910dsc14d9a.htm at 5. 
29 Id. 
56  
 
, the court refused to find an 
implication of bad faith when the plaintiff asserted the board 
could have done more to mitigate the antitrust concerns in a 
rejected offer.30 Therefore, a board could, for example, 
reasonably conclude selling off a lucrative government 
contracting business in order to permit the sale of other assets 
to a foreign investor would be too risky. 
However, targets of hostile offers can use political 
pressure to wear down a hostile bidder. The board may even 
be able to rely on a preferred-domestic acquirer to carry out 
the dirty work of lobbying for CFIUS scrutiny. In its battle 
with the Chinese company China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) over Unocal, Chevron issued a 
government 31 and also lobbied politicians, resulting in 
members of Congress urging a CFIUS investigation into the 
competing offer. 32 CNOOC also hired lobbyists 33 and invited 
review by CFIUS, but it was ultimately unsuccessful in its 
attempts to fight back.34 
 
 
B. BOARDS SEEKING FRIENDLY DEALS 
A board seeking a friendly deal with a foreign investor 
will need to plan ahead to increase the probability of CFIUS 
approval. As a preliminary step, the company should identify 
any ways in which its own business might trigger 
 
30 
CIV.A. 6623-VCN, 2013 WL 396202 at *9. 
31 Press Release, Chevron Corp., Chevron Corporation 
Statement on Unocal Transaction (June 22, 2005), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/00009501490500 
0441/f10205ae425.htm. 
32 Matt Pottinger, Russell Gold, et al., Cnooc Drops Offer 
for Unocal, Exposing U.S.-Chinese Tensions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 
2005), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112295744495102393. 
33 Id. 
34 Justin Blum, CNOOC Requests U.S. Security Scrutiny, 
WASH. POST (June 28, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dyn/content/article/2005/06/27/AR2005062701501.html. 
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CFIUS review. This has become harder to predict, and it 
should encompass not only obvious triggers such as 
government contracts but also particular assets such as 
potentially sensitive real estate.35 
After reviewing its own business, the target board should 
evaluate its potential acquirers. 36 As much as possible, the 
target should seek out information on the acquiring company, 
such as its sources of financing and connections to foreign 
governments. 37 Some foreign companies, such as sovereign 
wealth funds or companies known to have close ties to foreign 
governments, appear to be more likely to trigger U.S. 
scrutiny. For example, the House Intelligence Committee 
recommended the Obama administration block acquisitions 
by the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE.38 
Additionally, transparency is a major concern for both 
CFIUS and Congress. In Chongquing Casin Enterprise 
Exchange, opponents of the deal cited the lack of 
relationship to the Chinese government.39 Even the CEO of 
the exchange has stated that he does not know who owns the 
company and that it is unclear whether the Chinese 
government has a minority stake.40 A target board seeking a 
 
35 See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press 
Secretary, Order Signed by the President Regarding the Acquisition 
of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by Ralls Corporation 
(Sept. 28, 2012) (wind farms were located near U.S. naval facilities). 
36 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 5, at 27 28 (listing risk- 
mitigating factors that CFIUS considers during investigation of 
transactions). 
37 See, e.g., id. 
38 Id. 
39 Letter from 47 Members of Congress to the Hon. Marisa Lao, 
, 
https://lynnjenkins.house.gov/uploads/Letter%20To%20CFIUS%2 
0Re%20Chicago%20Stock%20Exchange%20Purchase.pdf. 
40 Josh Rogin, Congress Wary of National Security Implications 
of Chinese Deal for Chicago Stock Exchange, CHI. TRIB. (Feb.
 17, 2016, 8:29 AM), 
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foreign investor should therefore encourage a potential 
acquirer to disclose this sort of information, rather than 
permitting opponents to create costly regulatory hurdles due 
to a lack of disclosure.41 
The target should also consider how to structure its sale 
to best avoid CFIUS scrutiny.42 A target may make itself more 
attractive to foreign suitors by preemptively selling any 
CFIUS-triggering aspect of the business, then selling the 
remaining portion of the business to a foreign buyer.43 To 
maximize sale value, the parties will want to choreograph the 
remain separate.44 In the bankruptcy auction for A123 
Systems, for example, the bankers running the auction 
contacted a U.S. company to bid for sensitive security assets, 
while a Chinese company bid on the larger remainder.45 
Pairing these bids enabled the deal to proceed without 
scrutiny.46 
 
 
IV. DURING THE DEAL 
A. DEAL PRICE 
Once a deal is in process, a target board should work to 
ensure that its shareholders are adequately compensated for 
the regulatory risks posed by a foreign acquisition. This 
 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-congress-chicago- 
stock-exchange-sale-20160217-story.html. 
41 See Merrill, supra note 14, at 36-40. 
42 See, e.g., Julie Wernau, Navitas Key to Sale of A123 to 
Chinese  Firm, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-01-30/business/ct-biz- 
0130-navitas-20130130_1_navitas-systems-wanxiang-group- 
microsun-technologies. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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t to compensate [] 
47 despite an approximately 
48 Even 
Institutional Shareholder Services, a leading advisory firm, 
not adequately compensate for the regulatory risk.49 
described above.50 
Chinese buyers use cash as consideration more than half 
of the time, which may be attractive to stockholders.51 
However, a target board should inquire about the origin of the 
-CNOOC battle, Chevron 
-interest loans gave it an 
unfair advantage, a claim echoed by political opponents of the 
CNOOC bid.52 In another recent case, the 
 
47 Shareholder Presentation, Unocal Corp., Unocal and 
Chevron  (Rule 425 Filing) (Aug. 3, 2005), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/93410/00009501490500 
0521/f10205ce425.htm. 
48 David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Oil 
Giant in Takeover Bid for U.S. Corporation, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 
2005) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/23/business/worldbusiness/chine 
se-oil-giant-in-takeover-bid-for-us-corporation.html. 
49 Press Release, Unocal Corp., Unocal Wins ISS Support 
for Merger with Chevron (Aug. 1, 2005), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/containers/fix014/716039/000 
089882205000892/aug1pr.txt. 
50 supra note 28. 
51 See Nisha  Gopalan  &  Christopher  Langner, Deal or No 
Deal?, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1, 2016, 2:11 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-04-01/deal-or-no- 
deal (noting 62% of Chinese buyers were to pay cash in failed or 
withdrawn deals); see also Alfred Rappaport & Mark L. Sirower, 
Stock or Cash? The Trade-Offs for Buyers and Sellers in Mergers 
and Acquisitions, HARV.   BUS.   REV. (Nov.-Dec. 1999), 
https://hbr.org/1999/11/stock-or-cash-the-trade-offs-for-buyers- 
and-sellers-in-mergers-and-acquisitions (stating shareholders of 
acquiring companies fare worse in stock transactions than they do 
in cash transactions). 
52 See   Allen   Sloan,  Parent's  Help   Puts  Cnooc   Bid in 
Different Light, WASH. POST (July 26, 2005) (stating that Chevron 
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fact that the foreign offeror, Origin Technology Corporation, 
was a shell entity with unclear financing, was a reason for the 
U.S. target, Affymetrix Incorporated, to choose a domestic 
acquirer, notwithstanding a nominally higher bid.53 
 
 
B. TERMINATION FEES AND CFIUS-RELATED COVENANTS 
Aside from the pricing negotiation, the parties will need 
to determine how to address the CFIUS process in the merger 
agreement. There are three related decisions: the choice of 
whether to notify the Committee, the value of any CFIUS-
related reverse termination fee, and the standard to which the 
  covenant. 
 
 
1. NOTIFICATION 
In most cases, parties who think they may  fall within the 
 binding 
 
 
 
has raised doubts about  bid and that it would receive 
$4.5 billion from its parent company as a 30-year loan carrying a 
3.5% interest rate); see also Press Release, Richard Pombo, Pombo 
Statement on CNOOC Bid Withdrawal (Aug. 2, 2005), 
https://votesmart.org/public-statement/119861/pombo-statement- 
on-cnooc-bid-
bid withdrawal is good news for the free market); but see Kate 
Linebaugh, How Favorable Is Oil Bid's Financing?, WALL ST. J. 
(June 30, 2005, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112007688254773231 (arguing 
the loans terms were not significantly advantageous to CNOOC). 
53 See Kevin Miller & Megan Durisin, Affymetrix Rejects 
$1.5 Billion Origin Bid, Favors Thermo, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 
2016, 5:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016- 
03-20/affymetrix-rejects-1-5-bid-billion-origin-bid-favors-fisher 
(stating Affymetrix rej
instead continues to recommend Thermo Fisher for its planned 
merger who offers $14 per share). 
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them to work together in notifying CFIUS.54 On the other 
hand, the parties may not want to work together because they 
want to communicate confidence that the deal does not raise 
any CFIUS issues. As described in greater detail below, there 
is some evidence of such a signaling effect in the antitrust 
context. In the ongoing Tianjin-Ingram Micro deal, for 
example, the parties publicly decided not to notify, based on 
Committee.55 A few months later, however, they reversed 
56 In general, parties 
involved in most of the major deals discussed in this article 
did notify the Committee. Furthermore, many of those parties 
had joint covenants, which required them to work together on 
the CFIUS notification. 
 
 
 
2. TERMINATION FEES & EFFORTS CLAUSES 
A target board involved in a transaction likely to trigger 
CFIUS scrutiny should require inclusion of a reverse 
 
54 See Merrill, supra note 14, at 37-38 (explaining the 
Committee has required joint-filings). 
55 See generally Press Release, Ingram Micro Inc., Ingram 
Micro Deal FAQs (Feb. 17, 2016), http://phx.corporate- 
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=98566&p=hnagroup (such a move is risky; 
some commenters have suggested part of the reason the 3Com bid 
failed was that the acquirers did not voluntarily notify until the 
Committee was already interested in the transaction); Merrill,  supra 
note 14, at 39 n.228. See Vipal Monga, Ingram Micro To Submit $6 
Billion Tianjin Tianhai Deal for CFIUS Review, WALL ST. J.
 (July 21, 2016, 5:19 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2016/07/21/ingram-micro-to-submit-6- 
billion-tianjin-tianhai-deal-for-cfius-review/ (stating the company 
had previously indicated it did not expect to go before CFIUS but 
then reversed course). 
56 Monga, supra note 55. 
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termination fee provision in the agreement. This fee will be 
enforceable after a blocked deal, even if the target later finds 
another acquirer,57 and compensates shareholders for the 
costs of delays or a busted deal. Related to any fee  provision 
will be the efforts covenant: requiring the  acquirer to reach 
some standard of effort in complying with a CFIUS 
regulatory requirement for closing.58 
A survey of merger agreements shows a spectrum of 
CFIUS-related termination fees and efforts clauses. In 
offered a 3% termination fee in the event their bid failed to 
clause that included a commitment to making necessary 
divestitures.59 The ambiguity of the termination fee clause, 
and in particular its relationship to CFIUS action, resulted in 
litigation.60 Target boards should thus take heed and make 
such clauses explicit. In 2014, Siemens agreed to  a 5% 
reverse termination fee in the event CFIUS rejected its 
planned acquisition of Dresser-Rand, as well as a wide- 
obligations.61 
SuccessFactors, the parties required reasonable best efforts 
but also included an explicit limitation on obligations to 
 
57 In re Chateaugay Corp., 198 B.R. 848, 861 (S.D.N.Y.  1996). 
58 See,    e.g.,    Dale    Collins,    Sample   Antitrust-Related 
Provisions in  M&A  Agreements, ANTITRUST UNPACKED: 
ANTITRUST  LAW BLOG 17  (Apr. 27, 2013), 
http://www.antitrustunpacked.com/siteFiles/BlogPosts/antitrust_ris 
k_shifting4_27_2013.pdf. 
59 Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among Diamond 
II Holdings, Inc., Diamond II Acquisition Corp., and 3Com Corp., 
filed as Exhibit 2.1 to Form 8-K/A by 3Com, Inc. (Sept. 28, 2007). 
The   clause is at §6.1(b); the termination fee is at 
§8.3(c)(iii). 
60   3Com Corporation v. Diamond II Holdings, Inc., C.A.    No. 
3933-VCN, 2010 WL 2280734 (May 31, 2010) (case relating to 
discovery dispute over certain communications relating to the 
purpose of the termination fee). 
61 Siemens Energy Inc., Dynamo Acquisition Corp. & Dresser-
Rand Group, Inc., Agreement and Plan for Merger 35 (Sept. 21, 
 5.6(b). 
63  
 
make divestitures.62 In the Shanghui-Smithfield transaction 
described above, the parties explicitly excluded CFIUS risk 
from the reverse termination fee.63 On the other hand, they 
included a best efforts clause for regulatory compliance, as 
64 
More recently in the Fairchild deal, the board rejected a 
4.3% reverse termination fee as insufficient, even though the 
foreign consortium had also offered a hell or high water 
CFIUS covenant.65 In its ongoing acquisition of Ingram 
Micro, Tianjin offered a 6.7% reverse termination fee if the 
deal was rejected by CFIUS, despite the initial choice not to 
notify CFIUS.66 This suggests some tension between the 
parties with regard to the best approach: a high termination 
fee implies Ingram saw a need for protection against 
regulatory action, while the public decision not to seek 
CFIUS review suggested that Tianjin was initially confident 
CFIUS would not be interested in the deal. The recent 
 
It is hard to discern a pattern in these agreements; perhaps 
because the parties are allocating not only the risks of their 
particular deal but also risks due to unpredictable, shifting 
political tensions. It appears from this small sample that 
higher reverse termination fees are correlated with a greater 
likelihood of success, thus suggesting confidence on the part 
of the acquirer. 
Quantifying the value of a strong efforts clause is made 
more difficult by the lack of strong case law on what various 
 
62 SAP America, Inc., Saturn Expansion Corp., & 
SuccessFactors, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger 51,53 (Dec. 3, 
5.5(a) and the explicit non-divestiture clauses within § 5.5(h). 
63 See Smithfield Foods, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement 
(Schedule 14A) 154, § 8.03(e) (May 28, 2013). 
64 Id. at 139 40
that require the party to take any and all actions necessary to 
accomplish the objective. See, e.g., Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. 
v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 756 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
65 Fairchild Semicon supra note 28. 
66 Ingram Micro Inc., Current Report: Entry into a Material 
Definitive Agreement (Form 8-K) 3 (Feb. 17, 2016). 
64  
 
efforts such standards require.67 For this reason, targets are 
likely to require a significant and robust reverse termination 
example of a board explaining why a mid-range (4.3%) fee 
plus a strong efforts clause is insufficient, even with a pricing 
premium to the domestic alternative.68 
Are there risks associated with strong efforts clauses and 
termination fees? In the antitrust context, one study suggests 
effects from hell or high water clauses: the antitrust 
authorities are more likely to take notice of an agreement with 
such a clause (the signaling effect), and the parties will have 
less negotiating leverage with the government if they are 
bound to undertake divestitures or other major actions (the 
bargaining effect).69 
While similar effects may exist in the CFIUS context, the 
Committee has greater freedom than the antitrust authorities 
to investigate and require mitigation. Thus,  while a foreign 
acquirer may be signaling CFIUS and lowering its bargaining 
power through voluntary notification and efforts clauses, it is 
still probably wise to work with the authorities to assuage 
their concerns. 
 
 
 
C. MITIGATION 
A strong efforts clause is important because CFIUS 
approval may be conditioned on a variety of mitigation 
measures. At first blush, mitigation appears to be required 
 
67 
has not been clearly defined but may be met through good-faith 
judgment. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc., 965 A.2d at 755 (finding 
violation of an efforts clause when there was bad faith conduct). 
68 See Fairchild Semiconductor, Press Release, supra note 2. 
69 See John D. Harkrider, Risk-Shifting Provisions and Antitrust 
Risk: An Empirical Examination, 20 ANTITRUST 52, 56 (2005). 
65  
 
relatively rarely; CFIUS reports only 8% of cases from 2012 
to 2014 required mitigation.70 This statistic is somewhat 
misleading, however, because it is based on all covered 
transactions, and the definition of a covered transaction is 
quite broad; a more useful data point is nearly 22% of all 
investigated transactions required mitigation measures in 
2013.71 CFIUS can require a variety of mitigation measures 
ranging from passive ownership through proxy boards staffed 
only by U.S. citizens, to active ownership with information-
sharing restrictions between the parent and the domestic 
corporation.72 
CFIUS does not disclose specific mitigation 
requirements in approved deals, but a review of several recent 
deals gives a sense of the spectrum of what can be required. 
sovereign wealth fund invested in Citibank. To allay any 
fears over the investment  hardly a trivial concern given the 
furor over the Dubai Ports World deal a year earlier  the 
fund confirmed that it would not be involved in the 
management or operation of Citibank.73 
approval for its acquisition of Nexen Inc. in 2013, 74 
contingent on compliance with mitigation requirements. 
According to a leaked e-mail, the mitigation measures 
-making 
authority on Gulf Coast oil projects.75 In contrast to the 
 
70 JACKSON, supra note 5, at 23. 
71 Id. at 3, 23 27 (Table I-2 noting there were 48 
investigations in 2013, and page 27 noting 11 negotiations resulted 
in mitigation measures to arrive at 22%). 
72 See id. at 23. 
73 See Heather Timmons & Julia Werdigier, For Abu Dhabi 
and Citi, Credit Crisis Drove Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2007), 
www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/business/worldbusiness/28invest.ht 
ml. 
74 Rebecca Penty, Cnooc Wins Final Approval for $15.1 
Billion Nexen Buy, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2013, 10:36 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-02-12/cnooc-wins- 
final-approval-for-15-1-billion-nexen-buy. 
75 See Rebecca  Penty  &  Sara  Forden, Cnooc Said to Cede 
Control of Ne ,  BLOOMBERG  (Mar.  1,  2013, 
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Citibank deal, CNOOC would still be able to have a partial 
role in the operation of the company.76 
Foreign investors acquiring particularly sensitive assets 
may also use Proxy Agreements and Special Security 
Arrangements     (SSA).   77 The Italian company 
 a 
U.S. defense contractor, illustrates these alternatives.78 A 
subsidiary with a proxy board arrangement is used to address 
the most serious, top-secret contracts.79 The parent can only 
review financial information and generally takes a passive 
role.80 For those operations involving secret level clearances 
(and below), Finmeccanica set up a U.S. subsidiary with an 
SSA: a board comprised of three outside directors (all U.S. 
citizens) and two inside directors (one of whom was a U.S. 
citizen). 81 There are additional information security 
requirements and both subsidiaries are expected to be 
financially independent.82 
The specific mitigation measures required appears to be 
based on the type of threat CFIUS may perceive.83 Boards of 
companies involved in sensitive national security or critical 
infrastructure businesses may want to consider proposing 
proxy or SSA arrangements proactively, as 
 
7:43 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03- 
01/cnooc-said-to-cede-control-of-nexen-s-u-s-gulf-assets. 
76 See id. 
77 See e.g., Office of the  Deputy  Under  Secretary  of  Defense 
for Policy Support, INT L PROGRAMS SECURITY HANDBOOK 126
 (2009), 
http://www.iscs.dsca.mil/documents/ips/Chapter12_062009.pdf. 
78 Finmeccanica  to  Acquire  DRS  for  US  $5.2  billion, 
PRNEWSWIRE.COM (May 12, 2008 1:00 PM), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/finmeccanica-to- 
acquire-drs-for-us52-billion-euro-34-billion-57237712.html. 
79 FOCI FAQs, U.S. DEP T OF DEF., DEF. SEC. SERV. (Feb. 
2008), http://www.dss.mil/isp/foci/foci_faqs.html. 
80 MORAN, supra note 21, at 30 31. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Spalding, supra 
framework may be a useful guide here. SSAs and proxy 
arrangements appear to be most appropriate for the second and  third 
types of threats in his taxonomy). 
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opposed to passively or retroactively, in their notice to CFIUS 
to show their goodwill. Even if the parties do not propose such 
measures, they may be forced to accept them.84 For exchange 
offers in which shareholders will continue to own a stake in 
the merged company, the target board should carefully 
evaluate how ongoing compliance with these intrusive 
governance requirements might impact the value of the 
company going forward. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
While foreign investors grow increasingly concerned 
expand its role to address concerns over the state of the United 
and susceptibility to espionage.85 As the deals discussed in 
this article show, boards of American companies should 
watch this debate carefully because it will influence not only 
the willingness of foreign investors to make acquisition 
proposals but also the tactics with which these domestic 
boards respond. 
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85   Worldwide 
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2016) https://www.armed- 
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